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Abstract
This paper analyses the evaluation of the relative performance of a set
of groups when their outcomes are dened in terms of categorical data and
the groupsmembers are heterogeneous. This type of problem has been
dealt with in Herrero and Villar (2013) for the case of a homogenous popu-
lation. Here we expand their model controlling for heterogeneity by means
of inverse probability weighting techniques. We apply this extended model
to the analysis of compulsory education in the OECD countries, using the
data in the PISA. We evaluate the relative performance of the di¤erent
countries out of the distribution of the studentsachievements across the
di¤erent levels of competence, controlling by the studentscharacteristics
(explanatory variables regarding schooling and family environment). We
nd that di¤erences in mathematical and reading abilities across OECD
countries would lower by between 40% and 50% if their endowment of
studentscharacteristics would be that for the OCDE average.
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We evaluate relative performance with heterogeneous groups and categorical outcomes.  
We apply our model and evaluate OECD schoolchildren’s mathematical and reading abilities.  
Students' characteristics account for one half of the country differences in PISA.  
We show how the relative position of countries changes as we expand the covariates. 
We analyze how relative performance has changed in the first decade of the 21st Century.  
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1 Introduction
We consider here an evaluation problem in which we have to compare the rela-
tive performance of several groups, out of the distribution of the achievements
of their members in a set of ordered categories. Think for instance of the com-
parison of the health situation of di¤erent countries out of the distribution of
the population in four or ve health statuses (e.g. from "excellent" to "very
bad"). The key elements of the problem are, therefore, the presence of several
groups, the qualitative nature of the outcome variable, which resolves into a
given set of ordered categories, and the focus on relative performance.
This type of problem has been addressed recently by Herrero and Villar
(2013). They start by considering pairwise comparisons between groups in terms
of the probability that an agent picked at random in one group belongs to a
higher category than an agent randomly chosen in the other. Then they extend
those comparisons to all groups involved, by taking into account both direct
and indirect relations. As a result they obtain an evaluation function that
corresponds to the dominant eigenvector of a matrix that describes all those
comparisons (see below). This evaluation function is characterized in terms of
some ethical and operational properties.
An implicit assumption in their model is that groups are homogeneous so
that the distribution of the outcome variable is the sole relevant information. Yet
one might be interested in evaluating not only the observed outcomes but also
the extent to which those outcomes reect diverse structural characteristics of
the population that a¤ect the agentsperformance. This may well be the case
in the example mentioned above (comparing the health situation of di¤erent
countries), regarding the inuence of aspects such as age or wealth in the nal
outcomes. To deal with this type of evaluation we need a methodology that
permits making comparisons in terms of a common set of characteristics. This
is the key point of this paper. More specically, we combine here the original
model in Herrero and Villar (2013) with inverse probability weighting (IPW)
techniques that permits one controlling for di¤erences in the distribution of the
determinants of the outcome variable.
Using this methodological approach we obtain a covariate-adjusted evalua-
tion that allows isolating the impact of the selected explanatory variables, by
comparing this evaluation with the unadjusted one. In that way we can separate
the part of the observed di¤erences that is explained by the covariates and the
part which cannot be accounted for. The covariate-adjusted eigenvector tells us
about the relative performance of the groups once their conditioning variables
have been equalized. Comparing the covariate-adjusted and the unadjusted
evaluations permits one to estimate the impact of the latent variables on the
relative performance.
The interpretation of the di¤erences between both evaluations depends on
the problem at hand and, in particular, on the choice of the explanatory vari-
ables. In this respect our analysis is reminiscent of the "equality of opportunity"
literature, as covariate-adjusted values might be interpreted as an expression of
the di¤erential "e¤ort", whereas the unadjusted values would reect the in-
2
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terplay of both e¤ort and "opportunity".1 Yet, this model does not provide
a "measure" of equality of opportunity, as our comparison deals with relative
performance both in the adjusted and unadjusted evaluations.
We apply this extended model to the evaluation of compulsory education in
the OECD using the data provided by the Program for International Students
Assessment (PISA). We evaluate the performance of schoolchildren regarding
mathematical ability, out of the 2012 data set (the last one available). Our
evaluation involves the estimation of the impact of the studentsenvironment
(parental and school characteristics) on the nal scores. Comparing the ad-
justed and unadjusted evaluations allows concluding that the set of explanatory
variables accounts for almost 50% of the di¤erences in the relative performance.
We also consider how those di¤erences have evolved in the rst decade of the
21st Century, by comparing the results in 2012 and those in 2003. We nd
that di¤erences in studentsmathematical ability across OECD countries have
decreased during that period, particularly so for European OECD countries.2
We also analyze the evolution of country di¤erences in reading competence
using the 2009 and 2000 PISA reports, that focused on that subject. We nd
that the di¤erences in studentsreading ability across OECD countries lowered
during the rst decade of the 21st Century to a greater extent that the dif-
ferences in mathematical competence did. The countries that improve (lower)
their relative position in one of the two competences are likely to be those that
improve (lower) their relative position in the other competence. Finally, we nd
that studentsenvironmental factors also account for between 40% and 50% of
country di¤erences in relative performance in reading ability.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the formal model
whereas Section 3 applies it to the results on mathematical competence out of
the data in the PISA (2003 and 2012). Section 4 gathers a few nal comments.
2 The Model
Consider a set of g groups or societies, G = f1; 2; :::; gg; each of which consists
of ni agents, i 2 G: We want to compare the relative performance of those
groups with respect to a given aspect, when their achievements are given in
1Equality of Opportunity (EOp) is one of the most prominent concepts of distributive
justice. The key idea behind this concept is that the concern about inequality should not
focus on the equality of outcomes but rather on the existence of a common playing eld for all
people. From this perspective agentsoutcomes can be regarded as deriving from two di¤erent
sources: e¤ort and opportunity. E¤ort refers to peoples decisions whereas opportunity refers
to the agents external circumstances. A fair society is one in which nal outcomes do not
depend much on the agents external circumstances, that is, a society in which all people
share similar opportunities. In that society outcome di¤erences are basically determined
by the agents preferences and e¤ort and not by aspects that are beyond their control and
responsibility (see Arneson, 1989; Cohen, 1989; Roemer, 1993, 1998; Fleurbaey, 2008).
2Here again our analysis is very close to that of equality of opportunity in education. See on
this respect Peragine and Serlenga (2008), Lefranc et al. (2008), Chechi and Peragine (2010),
Calo-Blanco and Villar (2010), OECD (2010 b), Villar (2012), Calo-Blanco and García-Pérez
(2013).
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categorical terms. More precisely, we assume that there is a set of categorical
positions, H = fh1; :::; hsg; ordered from best to worst, h1      hs (health
statuses, educational levels, age intervals, professional positions, etc.). Each
group presents a given distribution of achievements across those categories. Our
goal is comparing their relative performance, taking into account the role of
the di¤erences in the structural characteristics that may inuence the outcome
variable. To do so we divide the evaluation problem into two parts. First,
we assume that all groups are homogeneous regarding those characteristics, so
that the evaluation only takes into account their relative achievements. The
key point here is how to make systematic comparisons out of qualitative data.
Second, we consider that groups are heterogeneous and provide a method to
control for such heterogeneity.
2.1 The evaluation formula when groups are homogeneous
Let G = f1; 2; :::; gg stand for a set of g groups under the assumption that
they are homogeneous with respect to the aspect under evaluation. Let air;
for i = 1; :::; g; r = 1; :::s; be the proportion of people of group i in position
r; and let A stand for the matrix that collects all those values (that is, the ith
row of matrix A describes the distribution of achievements of group i across the
di¤erent categories, in terms of relative frequencies).
An evaluation problem, or simply a problem, can be summarized by that
matrix A; under the assumption that the set of groups, G; and the set of cat-
egorical positions, H; are given, and that we focus on the relative frequencies
of the agents across the categorical positions, independently on the size of the
groups (a property known as group replication invariance). Our target is to
dene a suitable evaluation function that enables comparing the relative perfor-
mance of the di¤erent groups.
Given an evaluation problem A we say that group i dominates group j
when it is more likely that an agent chosen at random from i occupies a higher
position than an agent chosen at random from j. Let pij be the probability that
an agent from group i occupies a higher position than an agent from group j;
and let eij = 1 pij pji (that is, the probability that an individual in i; chosen
at random, belongs to the same category that an individual in j; randomly
chosen). Note that, those probabilities can be easily computed as follows:
pij = ai1(aj2 +    ajs) + ai2(aj3 +    ajs) +   + ai;s 1ajs
eij = ai1aj1 +   + aisajs
In pairwise comparisons, the quotient pij=pji tells us the relative advantage
of group i with respect to group j. That is, pij=pji > 1 implies that people in i
have advantage over people in j; and viceversa.3
3Lieberson (1976) in a similar vein introduces the Index of Net Di¤erence, ND(i; j) =j
pij   pji j to inform about inequalities between two groups. If ND(ij) = 0, then pij = pji
that is, it is equally likely, given an individual chosen at random in any of the two groups that
the individual in i is at a better position than the individual in j than the other way around.
4
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Remark 1 When the distribution of the population in group i stochastically
dominates that of group j, we have that pij > pji:4
Note that, when there are more than two groups, pairwise comparisons only
cover part of the relevant domination relationships. This is so because in that
case one has to take into account not only direct dominance relations but also
the indirect ones. That is, the relative position of group i with respect to group
j also depends on how those groups relate to third parties.
Herrero and Villar (2013) introduce a summary measure of relative achieve-
ments that can take into account all those relations. They dene the relative
advantage of group i with respect to group j; RAij ; as the ratio between the
probability that i dominates j and the sum of the probabilities that group i be
dominated by other groups (a number between 0 and (g   1)): Formally:
RAij =
pijP
k 6=i pki
That is, RAij is directly proportional to the probability of i dominating j and
inversely proportional to the sum of the probabilities of i being dominated by
some other group. Observe that when there are only two groups, RAij = pij=pji;
whereas this value changes in the presence of more groups. A summary measure
of the overall advantage of a given group can thus be obtained as a weighted
average of the relative advantages with respect to all groups. That is,
RAi =
X
j 6=i
jRAij
where j is the weight attached to group j:
It is natural to look for a weighting system consistent with the evaluation
of relative advantages. That is, a weighting system such that j = RAj . That
means that one has to nd a vector v =(v1; v2; :::; vg) such that:
vi =
X
j 6=i
vjRAij =
X
j 6=i
vjpijP
k 6=i pki
(1)
Herrero and Villar (2013) show that such a vector always exists, it is strictly
positive and uniqu (up to normalization), and has an interesting number of
additional properties. Moreover, that vector v is easy to compute, since it
corresponds to the Perron eigenvector of the following matrix:
Q =
0BBBB@
g   1 Pi 6=1 pi1 p12    p1g
p21 g   1 
P
i 6=2 pi2    p2g
           
pg 1;1 pg 1;2    pg 1;g
pg1 pg2    g   1 
P
i 6=g pig
1CCCCA
The other extreme case is when ND(i; j) = 1; which happens whenever all individuals in one
of the groups are at better positions than those in the other group. Intermediate positions
provide with values of ND(i; j) between 0 and 1:
4Lefranc, Pistolesi and Trannoy (2008, 2009) make use of stochastic dominance for income
distributions to compare equality of opportunity among two di¤erent groups of people.
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The interpretation of the components of matrix Q is the following. O¤-
diagonal elements (elements in place ij with i 6= j) are simply pij ; that is, the
probability that an individual chosen at random in group i is at a higher position
than an individual chosen at random in group j: Thus all o¤-diagonal elements
capture the relative dominance between pairs of groups. As for the elements
in the diagonal, the element jj provides the probability of someone chosen at
random in group j to be at least in a position as good as (or better than) anyone
in any other group.
It is easy to check that matrix Q is a Perron matrix all whose columns add
up to (g 1): Therefore, assuming that matrix Q is irreducible, there is a unique
eigenvector, v >> 0; absorbent, and such that its components add up to g: The
components of such an eigenvector satisfy equation [1], and thus, provide the
evaluation we are looking for. Vector v can thus be regarded as a summary
measure of the relative performance of the di¤erent groups.
2.2 Controlling for heterogeneity
We now show how to combine this model with inverse probability weighting
(IPW) techniques that permit one controlling for di¤erences in the distribution
of the determinants of the outcomes in the di¤erent groups. We obtain in this
way a covariate-adjusted eigenvector that provides an evaluation of the rela-
tive performance once the impact of the di¤erences in the distribution of the
covariates has been cancelled. Comparing covariate-adjusted and unadjusted
evaluations tells us about the inuence of the explanatory variables in the ob-
served performance.
The IPW estimators are easy to implement, allow for an undetermined
amount of heterogeneity in the estimates, and make no assumption on the dis-
tribution of the outcome variable H. Additionally, it has been shown in the
treatment e¤ects literature that the IPW estimators provide consistent and in
some cases asymptotically e¢ cient estimates of the parameter of interest un-
der fairly standard regularity conditions. Furthermore, Busso et al. (2012)
showed that the IPW estimators exhibit the best overall nite sample perfor-
mance among the broad class of treatment e¤ect estimators. This is particularly
relevant in the current context since estimation samples are of modest size in
many empirical applications.
The goal is to ensure the same distribution of the covariates (X) in each
category (h) of each group (r) used to calculate the eigenvector. We rst choose
one of the C = g  s subsamples in which the total sample is partitioned, labeled
cr, as the reference sample, i.e. that whose distribution of covariates is to be
used in the remaining C   1 subsamples. Alternatively, we could use the total
sample for group g or the overall sample for all the groups as the reference
sample. Later in this section we analyze how the reference sample a¤ects the
outcome of the evaluation tool and we also provide some insights on how to
select the reference sample.
Next, we generate a set of dummy indicator variables Zc that equal one if
an observation belongs to the reference sample and zero if it belongs to sub-
6
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sample c, for c 2 C; c 6= cr. We then estimate the conditional probability of
being in the reference sample given X, i.e. pc (x) = P (Zc = 1=X = x) for each
observation in subsample c, for c 2 C; c 6= cr. This variable is known as the
propensity score in the treatment e¤ects literature. The research value of the
propensity score rests on its power to solve the dimensionality problem, since
adjusting for between-groups di¤erences on a high dimensional vector of covari-
ates can be either di¢ cult or impossible. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show
that the propensity score captures all of the variance on the covariates relevant
for adjusting between-group comparisons, that is, treated (Zc = 1) and con-
trol (Zc = 0) units with the same value of the propensity score have the same
distribution of the elements in X.
The propensity score can be estimated by means of a simple binary choice
model like a logit or a probit model or by nonparametric methods like power
series regression. The distribution of the covariates in a particular subsample is
changed for that in the reference sample by simply introducing the appropriate
weighting function c. Formally, let g (X), g (X=Zc = 1) and g (X=Zc = 0) be
the joint density of X in the estimation sample, in the reference subsample and
in subsample c, respectively, and observe that by denition,
g (X) =
g (X=Zc = j)P (Zc = j)
P (Zc = j=X)
; for j = f0; 1g .
Then, it follows that:
P (Zc = 1=X) (1  P (Zc = 1))
(1  P (Zc = 1=X))P (Zc = 1)| {z }
c
 g (X=Zc = 0) = g (X=Zc = 1) , (2)
where P (Zc = 1) is the proportion of observations from the reference sample in
the estimation sample. This equation suggests a simple three-step method to
change the distribution of X in each subsample for that in the reference sample.
First, get an estimate of the propensity score for each observation in the sample.
Second, plug the estimated propensity score and the proportion of observations
from the reference sample in the estimation sample into the sample analog of c
to obtain an estimate of the weighting function.5 Next, use the estimated c to
weight observations of subsample c and calculate, for each group, the proportion
of observations in each category. The covariate-adjusted eigenvector is obtained
by simply applying the evaluation tool due to Herrero and Villar (2013) to the
new percentages.
This weighting scheme works by weighting-down (-up) the distribution of
1s of the dummy indicator variable (1  Zc) for observations in subsample c
for those values of the elements of X that are (over-) under-represented among
observations in the reference sample. The following overlap assumption on the
joint distribution of Z and X is necessary for the estimation problem to be well
dened: 0 < P (Zc = 1=X) < 1, for c 2 C. This common support condition
5The weights are normalized so that they add up to one within each subsample.
7
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states that for a given value of X there is some fraction of the estimation sample
in the reference sample and in subsample c to be compared. Lack of overlap as
well as estimated propensity scores close to one can lead to imprecise estimates
of c. To overcome this limitation we follow Crump et al. (2012). They propose
a systematic approach to addressing lack of overlap in estimation of average
treatment e¤ects by characterizing optimal estimation subsamples for which
the average treatment e¤ect can be estimated most precisely. Remarkably, the
optimal rule depends solely on the propensity score in most cases. We apply the
procedure in Crump et al. (2012) for the treatment e¤ect on the treated, the
parameter whose weighting function is that in [2], to each of the comparisons
that we perform.
That could be argued that only the observations of the reference sample that
belong to all the optimal estimation subsamples dened according to Crump
et al. (2012) should be used to calculate the covariate-adjusted eigenvector.
However, that requirement can only be satised if C is not very large and the
subsamples being compared do not di¤er to a great extent in the distribution of
the variables in X. Otherwise, the cost in terms of sacriced external validity
would be higher than the improvement in internal validity.
The choice of the reference sample a¤ects the relative importance of each
category within each group (aij), the probability that an agent from group i
occupies a higher position than an agent from group j (pij), the ratio between
any two ps and, thus, the outcome of the evaluation process (vi).6 The more
selected the reference sample, the higher the cost in terms of sacriced external
validity. That is the case for the lowest and highest prociency levels, partic-
ularly so in the latter case for the less developed OECD countries. We use the
overall sample of OECD countries as the reference sample in our application.
This way we analyze how the relative scholastic performance of the OECD coun-
tries would change if their endowment of environmental variables would be that
for the OCDE average.7
The covariate adjusted matrix corresponds to the homogenous groups case.
That is, the information has been transformed so that it describes the out-
comes that would have been obtained if all groups were similar regarding the
explanatory variabl s. The covariate-adjusted eigenvector, v; tells us the rela-
tive di¤erences in the groups that are not accounted for those variables. And,
consequently, the di¤erence between the eigenvector obtained with the origi-
nal data and the covariate-adjusted one tells us about the impact of leveling
the environmental variables in the evaluation of the relative performance of the
di¤erent groups.
This model is applied in the next Section to evaluate schoolchildren scholastic
performance across 30 OECD countries. We do so by considering the distrib-
6Conversely, the ratio between any two s is invariant to the selection of the reference
sample.
7Our results remain qualitatively largely unchanged when we use particular subsamples as
the reference sample. In general, we nd that the more selected is the reference subsample, the
higher is the di¤erence that accounting for covariates makes with respect to the unadjusted
eigenvector.
8
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ution of the students in ve categories of mathematical competence (the six
determined by PISA, after merging levels 5 and 6). This leaves us with 150
subsamples to compare. Moreover, there exists a large heterogeneity in the dis-
tribution of the variables in X both between and within OECD countries. For
these reasons, we cannot restrict the reference subsample to those observations
satisfying the optimal selection rule in all the comparisons. The same holds
when we restrict the analysis to the 21 OECD European countries.
3 The evaluation of compulsory education in the
OECD through PISA
Compulsory education is probably the most basic instance of social insurance as
it guarantees minimal levels of knowledge to all citizens in a given society, which
in turn conditions their opportunities regarding access to the labour market,
further education, and the extent of social interactions. Most OECD countries
have established a ten- to eleven-year period of compulsory education (from 6
to 15 or 16 years). It is important to know how e¤ective this education is, how
di¤erent are the educational outcomes both between and within countries, and
how much those di¤erences depend on the countriesobservable characteristics.
Here we apply the model presented above to evaluate compulsory education
in the OECD countries out of the data provided by the Programme for Inter-
national Student Assessment (PISA). This Programme provides the broadest
dataset for the evaluation of schoolchildren performance and the characteris-
tics of their schooling and family environments. It is a triennial worldwide test
of 15-year-old schoolchildrens scholastic performance, the implementation of
which is coordinated by the OECD. PISA surveys started in 2000 with the aim
of evaluating the studentsability, about the end of compulsory education, in
three di¤erent domains: mathematical, mathematics and science.
Every period of assessment specialises in one particular category, but it also
tests the other two main areas studied. The 2012 report is the most recent
one and it focused on mathematical ability, as the 2003 report did. We use
data in PISA 2012 to analyze the di¤erent performance of educational sys-
tems regarding schoolchildrens mathematical ability across OECD countries.8
The focus of our analysis is threefold. First, we investigate the relative per-
formance of OECD countries in 2012 comparing the distribution of mean score
tests and their relative performance, as measured by the corresponding (unad-
justed) eigenvector. Second, we estimate the students relative achievements
once their external circumstances have been equalized, using two di¤erent sets
of explanatory variables. And third, we provide a rapid overview of the changes
experienced in 2012 with respect to 2003. Given this purpose, we consider 30
8One of the assets of the PISA report is that it provides a unied scoring system to evaluate
the performance of 15-year-old students in very di¤erent countries. The units of those scores
are set with respect to the values obtained in the 2000 wave of the report, by taking a value
of 500 for the average of the OECD Member States with a standard deviation of 100.
9
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out of the 34 OECD countries, since Chile, Estonia, Israel and Slovenia did not
participate in the 2003 wave.
We also present evidence on the evolution of country di¤erences in reading
competence using the 2009 and 2000 PISA reports, that focused on that subject.
When doing so, we restrict the analysis to the 27 OECD countries that partic-
ipated in the four PISA reports and that provide information on the variables
used in the analysis.9
3.1 Comparing the relative performance of OECD educa-
tional systems in 2012
The PISA report provides a classication of the students in six di¤erent levels
of mathematical competence, from Level 1 (the lowest level) to Level 6 (the
highest one). Those levels are dened in terms of the capacity of the students
to master certain cognitive processes and operationalized in terms of ranges
of the scores obtained by the students (see Figure 1.2.12 in OECD (2010a) for
details). Table 1 summarizes the scoring intervals that parameterize those levels
of competence.
Insert Table 1 here
We combine levels 5 and 6 of mathematical competence into a unique upper
level since the share of students in the sixth level is quite low in most countries
and it does not allow us to obtain accurate estimates of the propensity score for
the students in that level.10 The reduction in the number of levels of mathe-
matical competence leaves almost unchanged the unadjusted eigenvectors but it
substantially increases the stability of the covariate-adjusted eigenvectors as we
increase the number of covariates used to estimate the propensity score. The
distribution of students within the ve levels of mathematical competence in
2012 is presented in Table 2.
Insert Table 2 here
In order to compare the performance of educational systems out of the dis-
tribution of outcomes in Table 2 we rely on the model of Section 2. Now groups
are OECD countries, members are the 15-year old students within each coun-
try, and categories correspond to the ve levels of mathematical competence.
Table 3 below presents the eigenvector for the year 2012 and compares those
values with the mean scores of the PISA tests.11 We present both unadjusted
9Japan, the Slovak Republic and Turkey are excluded from the estimation sample in this
comparative exercise.
10Less than 1% of the students have a reading competence of level 6 in 26 out of the 29
OECD countries.
11Test results are not presented in PISA as point estimates. Rather, PISA reports stu-
dent performance through ve plausible values that can be dened as random values from
the posterior distribution of an students performance (see OECD (2009) for details). As
indicated in OECD (2009), we perform our statistical analysis independently on each of the
ve plausible values. The nal eigenvector is the average of the eigenvectors obtained for
each of the ve plausible values. Anyway, the resulting eigenvectors are almost identical to
10
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and covariate-adjusted eigenvectors (indeed we present two di¤erent covariate
adjusted vectors, to be explained below). The eigenvectors have been normal-
ized so that the sum of its components equals the number of components. That
is, values above one indicate that the country performs over the mean, while
components below one are to be interpreted as performing below the mean.
Equivalently, the mean scores of the PISA tests have been normalized by set-
ting its average equal to one.
Insert Table 3 here
The unadjusted eigenvectors and the mean scores of the PISA tests yield
similar results in terms of ranking but rather di¤erent pictures in terms of cross-
country di¤erences, with the distribution of mean score values being far more
concentrated around the mean than that of eigenvector components. Indeed,
while the Kendalls rank order correlation coe¢ cient between the two evaluation
measures is 0.93, the coe¢ cient of variation of the eigenvector components is
6.7 times that of the mean scores.
The normalized mean score underestimates the relative advantage of the
countries that perform best at mathematics according to the eigenvector and
overestimates the relative position of the countries that perform worst. For ex-
ample, the normalized mean score of Korea, Japan, Belgium and Germany, the
four countries at the top of the distribution according to the eigenvector, are
46%, 35% and 25% lower than the corresponding eigenvector components, re-
spectively. Conversely, the mean scores of Sweden, Turkey, Greece and Mexico,
the four countries at the bottom of the distribution according to the eigenvec-
tor, are 37%, 103.2%, 106% and 307% higher than the corresponding eigenvector
components, respectively. The di¤erence between the two evaluation methods
is of modest size for the countries that perform close to the mean.
3.2 Accounting for di¤erences in characteristics
We now move to the covariate-adjusted eigenvectors in column (1). These were
obtained by using the set of studentsexternal factors that is common to both
the 2003 and the 2012 reports in the estimation of the propensity score.12 In
this specication we control for childrens sex and for the employment status
and the educational level of their parents by means of a set of dummy indicator
variables that inform on whether the father or the mother are employed and
whether their highest educational level is the secondary or the tertiary level
as dened in the International Standard Classication of Education (ISCED).
We also control for whether at least one of the parents was born in a country
di¤erent from their current country of residence and for whether there are at
least one hundred books at home or not.
Regarding their schooling environment, we control for the share of the school
total funding for a typical school year that comes from the government and
those obtained using the average of the ve plausible values as the summary measure of the
studentsperformance.
12The propensity scores are estimated using binary logit models.
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whether the assessments of students are used to make judgments about teach-
erse¤ectiveness or not.13 All these familiar and schooling factors are relevant
determinants of international di¤erences in studentseducational achievement
according to Hanushek and Woessmann (2011). Tables 4 and 5 summarize the
distribution of the familiar and schooling determinants for the 30 OECD coun-
tries, respectively.
Insert Table 4 here
Our estimates attest that accounting for heterogeneity makes a relevant dif-
ference. On the one hand, the coe¢ cient of variation of the eigenvector lowers
by 49%, once we control for di¤erences in characteristics. That is, the explana-
tory variables in (1) account for almost half of the variation in schoolchildrens
scholastic relative performance in mathematical ability across OECD countries.
On the other hand, the Kendalls correlation coe¢ cient between the unadjusted
and the covariate-adjusted eigenvectors is of only 0.37. This indicates that dif-
ferences in characteristics across OECD countries account for approximately
two thirds of the sorting of OECD countries that results from the unadjusted
eigenvector.
The relative advantage of children coming from the countries that do best
at mathematics according to the unadjusted eigenvector lowers once we con-
trol for heterogeneity. That is the case for Korea, Japan, Belgium, Germany
and Netherlands, whose relative advantage lowers between 20% and 50%. Con-
versely, the relative position of the countries that do worst according to the un-
adjusted eigenvector improves once we control for X. Portugal, Turkey, Greece
and Mexico improve their relative performance by approximately 55%, 91%,
63% and 212%, respectively. Poland stands out for being the only country that
performs over the mean according to the unadjusted eigenvector that improves
its relative position once we control for X. Germany, Finland, New Zealand
and Canada move from performing over the mean to performing below the
mean once we control for studentsexternal circumstances. The opposite holds
for the Slovak Republic, Portugal and the United States.14
One of our main ndings is that almost half of the inequality in students
mathematical ability across OECD countries is explained by country di¤erences
in studentsfamily and schooling characteristics. How much of the remaining dif-
ferences can be accounted for by introducing additional explanatory variables?
To investigate this issue we have included in Table 3 another covariate-adjusted
eigenvector in column (2), estimated by expanding the set of controls in spec-
ication (1) with some determinants of studentsachievements.15 This allows
us to analyze how the coe¢ cient of variation of the eigenvector components
13The relevance of government funding is preferred to the indicator of whether the school
is public or private because of the large number of missing values in the latter variable in the
2003 report.
14The relative position of Spain slightly improves once we control for X: This result is in
line with that in Ciccone and Garcia-Fontes (2009). They found that there is an increase in
Spains PISA scores relative to the rest of Europe when parental schooling is accounted for.
15Those are present only in the 2012 report and cannot be considered when comparing the
results in 2012 and in 2003.
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changes as we expand the set of covariates. In particular, in (2) we additionally
control for whether the school is located in a large city, i.e. a city with over
one million people, or not, for the percentage of teachers fully certied by the
appropriate authority in the school, whether students are grouped by ability or
not, whether the school monitors the practice of teachers or not and whether
the principal, the department head or the teachers have the main responsibility
for hiring teachers or not. Table 5 summarizes the distribution of these school-
ing characteristics across the 30 OECD countries. As before, these variables
are relevant determinants of studentsachievement tests according to Hanushek
and Woessmann (2011).
Insert Table 5 here
The di¤erence between the two covariate-adjusted eigenvectors is of modest
size, below 4% for 22 out of the 30 components. Moreover, the coe¢ cient of
variation remains largely unchanged when we expand the set of controls. This
nding suggests that there is a part of the di¤erence in the evaluation of stu-
dentsmathematical ability across OECD countries that cannot be explained
by the di¤erences in the characteristics that the theory suggests. That is to
say, there is a set of unobservable factors that induce the existence of inter-
national di¤erences, beyond the action of the standard determinants. Those
unobservable variables may refer to cultural and organizational factors, such as
the design of the educational system, the commitment of families and society
with education, the implementation of educational policies, the teachersatti-
tudes and involvement, and, of course, the average e¤ort of the students. The
low sensitivity of the coe¢ cient of variation of the covariate-adjusted eigenvec-
tor, with respect to the inclusion of ve relevant additional covariates, points
out the relevance of those factors. This is supported by the fact that the same
type of results appears between the regions of some countries.16
3.3 The evolution of relative performance
Let us now comment on how those values have evolved between 2003 and 2012,
so that we can have an idea of the dynamics of the educational systems. To
ease the discussion of the results, Table 6 below presents the eigenvector for the
year 2003 and compares those values with the mean scores of the PISA tests.
Insert Table 6 here
The rst point to be noted is that the unadjusted eigenvector has substan-
tially changed between the years 2003 and 2012. Indeed, the di¤erence between
the eigenvector components for the years 2003 and 2012 is signicantly di¤er-
ent from zero at conventional signicance levels for 19 out of the 30 OECD
16This is the case of Italy and Spain, countries that show an internal diversity of educational
outcomes (di¤erences between the regions within each country), similar to that of the OECD.
This is so in spite of formally having a common educational system.
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countries.17 Most of the countries that performed over the mean in the year
2003 lowered their relative advantage in studentsmathematical ability during
the period of analysis, with the reduction being largest for the Finland (30%),
Netherlands (26%), New Zealand (24%) and Australia (25%). Korea is the ex-
ception to the latter rule since it already performed over the mean in 2003 and
it improved its relative advantage from 2003 to 2012 by 38%, moving from the
5th position in the 2003 ranking to the rst position in 2012. We also nd that
11 out of the 15 countries that performed below the mean in 2003 lowered their
relative disadvantage during the rst decade of the 21th Century. The improve-
ment is particularly relevant for Poland (86%), Portugal (69%), Turkey (65%)
and Greece (64%). Poland is the only one of the latter countries that moves to
performing over the mean in the year 2012.
As a result of these changes, the coe¢ cient of variation of the unadjusted
eigenvector lowered by 11% from 2003 to 2012, attesting that inequality in
studentsmathematical ability across OECD countries lowered during the rst
decade of the 21th Century. Additionally, the Kendalls correlation between the
unadjusted eigenvectors in 2003 and in 2012 is 0.63, indicating that the ordering
of countries in terms of relative performance in mathematical competence has
changed from 2003 to 2012. The change is particularly relevant for Poland, that
improves its relative position in 18 positions, and for Denmark and Sweden,
that lose 12 positions each.
The relationship between the covariate-adjusted eigenvector and the unad-
justed one in 2003 is pretty much the same as in 2012, so that we shall not repeat
the analysis here. That is, the part of the international di¤erences in relative
mathematical performance explained by studentsenvironmental characteristics
has remained relatively constant at approximately 50% between the years 2003
and 2012.
Regarding the di¤erence between the covariate-adjusted eigenvector com-
ponents for the years 2003 and 2012, we nd that it is signicantly di¤erent
from zero at conventional signicance levels for only 10 out of the 30 OECD
countries. In particular, Poland, Portugal and Mexico stand out among the
countries that signicantly improve their relative position since they increase
their component by between 23% and 27%. Conversely, Netherlands lowers its
relative advantage once accounting for di¤erences in characteristics by 32% from
2003 to 2012. As a result, the Kendalls correlation between the 2003 and the
2012 covariate-adjusted eigenvectors is of 0.64. The coe¢ cient of variation of
17We use bootstrap to test whether the di¤erence between a countrys eigenvector compo-
nent in 2003 and in 2012 is statistically signicant or not. We implement bootstrap hypothesis
testing as follows. For each country, let nct indicate the number of students with level of read-
ing competence c in year t, for t = f2003; 2012g. For each country and for each c, we merge
the samples of the two years into one sample of
 
n2003c + n
2012
c

observations. We draw a
bootstrap sample of
 
n2003c + n
2012
c

observations with replacement from the merged sample
and we assign the rst n2003c observations to the rst year. We then calculate the eigenvectors
of the two years and we compute the di¤erence between them. We repeat these steps 1000
times. The p-value is then estimated as the number of times the di¤erence between the eigen-
vectors coming from bootstrap samples exceeds that observed in the original sample, divided
over the number of repetitions.
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the covariate-adjusted eigenvector (1) lowered by 16% between the years 2003
and 2012.
Our results remain almost unchanged when we restrict the analysis to the
21 European OECD countries in Table 2. In particular, we nd that students
external factors account for slightly more than one half of the di¤erences in rela-
tive performance in 2012 and that di¤erences across European OECD countries
in studentsmathematical ability have decreased from 2003 to 2012 more than
they have done in the OECD.18
3.4 What about di¤erences in reading competence?
We nally tested whether relative performance in reading and mathematical
competences evolved in a similar way during the rst decade of the 21st cen-
tury or not. We use the 2009 and 2000 PISA reports that focused on reading
competence to analyze country di¤erences in that subject and we restrict the
sample to the 27 OECD countries that participated in the four PISA reports.
The results are reported in Table 7. First, the results for the mathematical
competence are qualitatively identical to those in the preceding tables. Second,
we nd that the di¤erences in both studentsmathematical and reading abil-
ity across OECD countries lowered during the rst decade of the 21st Century,
particularly so in the latter case. The cross-country correlation between the
change in relative performance in mathematics and reading is close to 0.7. That
is, the countries that improve (lower) their relative position in one of the two
competences are likely to be those that improve (lower) their relative position
in the other competence analyzed.
Insert Table 7 here
We also nd that studentsenvironmental factors account for approximately
one half of country di¤erences in relative performance in both mathematics and
reading in the years 2003 and 2000, respectively. The relevance of students
familiar and schooling factors in accounting for country di¤erences in relative
performance lowered during the period of analysis. Anyway, studentsexternal
factors still account for 38% and 46% of country di¤erences in relative perfor-
mance in reading and mathematics in 2009 and 2012, respectively.
4 Final Remarks
We have presented here a model that combines the one developed in Herrero and
Villar (2013), that permits evaluating group performance with categorical data,
with inverse probability weighting (IPW) techniques that control for di¤erences
in the distribution of the determinants of the outcome variable. We obtain in this
way a covariate-adjusted eigenvector that, when compared with the unadjusted
one, allows us to estimate the impact of the di¤erence in characteristics over
the relative performance.
18These estimates are available upon request to the authors.
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We have applied this methodology to the evaluation of compulsory educa-
tion in the OECD through PISA 2003 and 2012. We nd that di¤erences in
mathematical ability across OECD countries would lower by approximately 50%
if their endowment of schooling and family characteristics would be that for the
OECD average. Equivalently, country di¤erences in reading ability would lower
by between 40% and 50%. We have also found that the di¤erences in students
mathematical and reading ability across OECD countries lowered during the
rst decade of the 21st Century, particularly so in the latter case.
There are two related questions that come to mind when considering this
particular application. First, why making an evaluation out of categorical data
(the distribution of students across the di¤erent levels of competence) when we
have all cardinal information that might be required? The reason is that rather
than relying on summary statistics (e.g. means and inequality measures) as it is
the case in most of the cardinal approaches, we are able to deal with discretized
versions of the whole distributions in a relatively simple way and so to extract
more information. Second, why to use just ve levels of competence rather than
richer distribution proles (e.g. using percentiles)? The answer here is twofold.
On the one hand, a small number of levels permits a richer set of covariates.
On the other hand, in this particular case, those levels are given externally so
that there is less arbitrariness in deciding the clusters by the analysts.
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Table 1. Levels of mathematical competence. PISA 2012.
Level of competence Score range
Level 6 >698
Level 5 626-698
Level 4 553-626
Level 3 480-553
Level 2 407-480
Level 1 Level 1a 335-407
Level 1b 262-335
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Table 2. Share of students at each prociency level on the mathematical
scale. OECD countries. PISA 2012.
Level 1
Country (or below) Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Sample size
Australia 0.149 0.251 0.291 0.206 0.100 9,996
Austria 0.120 0.240 0.304 0.239 0.095 3,444
Belgium 0.093 0.175 0.272 0.277 0.180 5,923
Canada 0.095 0.246 0.327 0.233 0.096 16,331
Czech Republic 0.112 0.208 0.269 0.264 0.145 4,108
Denmark 0.142 0.278 0.330 0.197 0.051 5,155
Finland 0.099 0.227 0.336 0.236 0.101 6,460
France 0.128 0.238 0.300 0.233 0.099 3,124
Germany 0.095 0.171 0.281 0.294 0.156 2,614
Greece 0.259 0.329 0.267 0.119 0.023 3,914
Hungary 0.167 0.298 0.298 0.171 0.064 3,527
Iceland 0.146 0.263 0.318 0.204 0.068 2,511
Ireland 0.108 0.262 0.337 0.220 0.072 3,795
Italy 0.153 0.267 0.314 0.197 0.067 24,041
Japan 0.070 0.176 0.306 0.267 0.179 4,613
Korea 0.063 0.152 0.247 0.277 0.260 3,797
Luxembourg 0.188 0.262 0.287 0.195 0.065 3,278
Mexico 0.427 0.368 0.166 0.034 0.003 24,159
Netherlands 0.094 0.199 0.286 0.280 0.140 3,339
New Zealand 0.136 0.235 0.281 0.219 0.127 2,752
Norway 0.148 0.272 0.320 0.196 0.063 3,413
Poland 0.080 0.234 0.302 0.249 0.133 3,449
Portugal 0.172 0.260 0.300 0.194 0.071 4,245
Slovak Republic 0.187 0.250 0.268 0.204 0.088 3,470
Spain 0.135 0.258 0.327 0.219 0.059 19,461
Sweden 0.176 0.282 0.309 0.181 0.049 3,446
Switzerland 0.094 0.209 0.304 0.258 0.133 8,363
Turkey 0.321 0.314 0.196 0.120 0.047 3,457
United Kingdom 0.137 0.272 0.314 0.199 0.076 8,981
United States 0.180 0.297 0.291 0.170 0.059 3,633
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Table 3. Eigenvectors and mean score. OECD, 2012. Mathematical compe-
tence.
Mean Covariate-adjusted
Country Unadjusted scorea (1) (2)
Australia 0.931 1.017 0.915 0.932
Austria 1.042 1.031 1.091 0.945
Belgium 1.444 1.081 1.135 1.229
Canada 1.079 1.038 0.985 1.001
Czech Republic 1.279 1.057 1.193 1.179
Denmark 0.808 0.998 0.946 0.972
Finland 1.128 1.040 0.930 0.978
France 1.052 1.027 1.047 1.039
Germany 1.428 1.076 0.928 0.929
Greece 0.452 0.930 0.735 0.742
Hungary 0.762 0.987 0.919 0.950
Iceland 0.901 1.004 0.773 0.738
Ireland 0.937 1.020 0.954 1.016
Italy 0.837 1.000 0.999 0.995
Japan 1.667 1.087 1.089 1.127
Korea 2.080 1.125 1.048 1.010
Luxembourg 0.845 0.989 0.988 0.996
Mexico 0.209 0.851 0.653 0.633
Netherlands 1.363 1.066 1.153 1.174
New Zealand 1.088 1.035 0.909 0.917
Norway 0.813 1.000 0.766 0.767
Poland 1.242 1.060 1.606 1.647
Portugal 0.760 0.995 1.180 1.125
Slovak Republic 0.813 0.997 1.284 1.191
Spain 0.884 1.007 0.891 0.905
Sweden 0.718 0.983 0.815 0.841
Switzerland 1.358 1.059 1.299 1.269
Turkey 0.455 0.924 0.867 0.871
United Kingdom 0.888 1.007 0.896 0.927
United States 0.737 0.982 1.005 0.954
Coe¤. of variation 0.370 0.055 0.190 0.190
Notes: a The mean is set equal to one. The symbols ** and *** indicate that the di¤erence
between the component and that for the same country and eigenvector (adjusted or unad-
justed) in the year 2003 is signicant at the 5% and 1% signicance level, respectively. We use
bootstrap hypothesis testing. The covariate-adjusted eigenvector in (1) controls for students
sex, their parentsemployment status and educational level, whether at least one of the par-
ents was born in a country di¤erent from their current country of residence, whether there are
at least one hundred books at home, the percentage of the school total funding for a typical
school year that comes from the government and whether the assessments of students are used
to make judgements about teacherse¤ectiveness. The eigenvector in (2) further controls for
whether the school is located in a city with over one million people, whether the principal, the
department head or the teachers have the main responsibility for hiring teachers or not, the
share of teachers fully certied by the appropriate authority in the shool, whether students
are grouped by ability, whether achievement data are used to evaluate the principals or the
teachersperformance and whether the school monitors the practice of teachers.
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Table 4. Studentspersonal and familiar characteristics. Descriptive statis-
tics. PISA 2012.
Father Mother Foreign Mothers educ. Fathers education
Country Women works works parenta Secondary Tertiary Secondary Tertiary 100 booksb
Australia 48.9 90.0 76.1 35.0 53.3 43.4 56.9 37.0 48.4
Austria 50.5 93.6 80.1 22.8 70.2 27.8 56.4 42.1 42.3
Belgium 50.8 91.0 79.7 26.0 40.2 56.1 46.1 50.0 40.7
Canada 51.2 91.7 80.9 27.3 35.4 63.4 44.1 54.0 45.1
Czech Republic 50.3 93.9 84.8 10.6 71.2 28.5 71.3 28.3 47.1
Denmark 51.4 84.9 78.6 31.3 38.8 57.1 52.0 44.6 36.0
Finland 50.7 87.2 84.3 23.0 25.4 72.0 32.4 63.1 43.3
France 52.2 90.3 80.0 24.7 50.4 47.6 55.6 42.4 39.9
Germany 50.5 94.3 80.4 15.4 68.0 29.9 52.1 45.9 54.8
Greece 51.7 81.6 58.1 18.1 51.0 43.0 49.8 42.1 37.1
Hungary 52.7 86.9 76.0 5.5 61.9 37.7 68.9 30.5 51.7
Iceland 50.4 94.1 85.1 11.2 43.6 56.4 51.5 48.5 56.8
Ireland 50.0 81.6 63.4 27.3 52.8 44.2 54.2 40.1 42.6
Italy 49.8 92.0 65.9 14.0 68.7 28.6 70.5 26.0 40.5
Japan 47.6 97.0 77.1 1.5 50.5 49.5 49.7 50.3 43.1
Korea 45.2 90.5 58.7 0.4 56.1 42.5 44.8 53.6 62.6
Luxembourg 48.7 90.2 72.3 65.2 45.1 38.4 44.1 40.3 50.5
Mexico 52.2 85.6 40.4 3.1 42.1 28.3 40.4 31.6 8.7
Netherlands 49.3 91.8 78.6 18.2 49.9 45.5 44.5 49.5 35.4
New Zealand 51.7 92.3 77.5 43.0 54.1 44.0 58.8 37.3 48.1
Norway 49.4 92.7 86.4 18.0 39.7 59.0 49.6 49.5 49.9
Poland 52.9 87.6 71.4 0.9 75.3 24.6 81.3 18.4 38.1
Portugal 50.6 86.2 75.3 19.7 47.7 23.2 44.1 19.7 30.3
Slovak Republic 46.7 87.2 77.4 5.2 74.1 25.3 76.5 23.0 31.2
Spain 50.6 86.2 69.1 15.6 49.0 41.6 46.3 41.1 50.2
Sweden 51.5 93.4 89.5 25.2 35.7 62.4 45.8 51.4 47.8
Switzerland 50.6 94.1 75.4 42.9 57.8 37.8 47.5 48.5 37.7
Turkey 51.6 71.2 14.8 2.8 27.3 11.5 37.9 23.9 19.9
United Kingdom 50.3 88.9 77.3 18.4 50.3 49.0 55.1 43.8 40.1
United States 49.6 85.9 73.7 29.6 42.7 52.1 49.7 44.3 30.8
Notes: a Informs on whether at least one of the students parents was born in a country
di¤erent from their current country of residence. b Indicates whether there are at least one
hundred books at home or not.
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Table 5. Schooling characteristics. Descriptive statistics. PISA 2012.
Large Fund. Evaluate Certied
Country cityc govern.d teacherse Controlf Trackg Monitorh teachersi
Australia 39.0 68.1 96.9 64.8 80.2 90.8 86.3
Austria 34.2 69.9 96.8 67.9 69.7 91.6 77.6
Belgium 33.4 72.3 95.3 71.2 73.6 92.3 77.9
Canada 37.3 67.8 97.4 62.0 79.8 91.0 88.0
Czech Republic 31.7 69.0 95.5 71.5 72.1 90.7 81.6
Denmark 31.1 71.2 96.4 72.5 72.8 90.0 78.5
Finland 32.0 70.5 95.7 70.6 72.4 90.3 79.4
France 29.9 71.9 96.8 71.2 69.8 93.3 76.6
Germany 29.5 73.0 96.2 69.9 70.8 92.8 76.9
Greece 32.7 70.8 96.0 69.3 69.5 91.4 78.9
Hungary 31.5 70.1 98.2 67.7 72.1 90.1 79.5
Iceland 26.6 78.9 97.9 78.0 76.9 93.5 79.3
Ireland 33.9 70.7 96.6 70.7 70.4 91.7 78.0
Italy 36.5 59.3 97.7 51.9 76.5 91.5 87.4
Japan 32.8 69.8 96.8 70.3 71.2 91.5 77.1
Korea 29.4 71.1 97.3 72.2 72.9 94.1 79.0
Luxembourg 32.0 70.1 100.0 65.4 76.3 96.1 89.2
Mexico 39.6 53.4 98.2 52.8 75.4 92.8 87.1
Netherlands 34.0 69.6 97.2 69.9 71.3 91.9 78.4
New Zealand 32.2 70.5 97.1 71.4 73.3 92.1 80.0
Norway 30.7 71.0 97.3 69.1 71.7 91.5 77.7
Poland 34.7 72.7 96.9 69.1 69.4 91.6 81.0
Portugal 33.7 69.5 97.0 69.5 71.2 91.9 77.9
Slovak Republic 34.4 73.4 96.2 75.2 67.5 92.1 73.4
Spain 37.8 66.0 97.6 61.1 80.8 89.9 88.0
Sweden 32.8 71.1 96.4 69.8 72.4 92.2 78.6
Switzerland 33.4 73.0 96.3 70.6 74.6 88.8 82.1
Turkey 32.5 72.0 98.0 70.3 71.5 93.3 77.5
United Kingdom 36.2 72.0 97.2 70.9 77.8 90.6 82.5
United States 29.2 70.7 97.7 73.0 72.3 92.4 78.5
Notes: c Indicates whether the school is located in a city with over one million people or
not. d Informs on the percentage of the school total funding for a typical school year that
comes from the government. e Indicates whether the assessments of students are used to
make judgements about teacherse¤ectiveness or not. f Indicates whether the principal, the
department head or the teachers have the main responsibility for hiring teachers or not. g
Indicates whether students are grouped by ability or not. h Indicates whether the school
monitors the practice of teachers. i Informs on the share of teachers fully certied by the
appropriate authority in the school.
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Table 6. Eigenvectors and mean scores. OECD countries, 2003. Mathemat-
ical competence.
Unadjusted Mean Covariate-adj.
Countries eigenvector scorea eigenvector
Australia 1.238 1.046 0.892
Austria 1.010 1.025 1.182
Belgium 1.704 1.102 1.272
Canada 1.150 1.046 0.964
Czech Republic 1.437 1.077 1.102
Denmark 1.109 1.034 0.859
Finland 1.616 1.082 1.001
France 1.073 1.040 1.162
Germany 1.126 1.027 0.938
Greece 0.275 0.880 0.716
Hungary 0.692 0.967 1.001
Iceland 0.990 1.029 0.850
Ireland 0.892 1.009 1.060
Italy 0.799 0.978 0.926
Japan 1.514 1.056 0.999
Korea 1.502 1.080 1.057
Luxembourg 0.735 1.018 1.228
Mexico 0.156 0.817 0.521
Netherlands 1.835 1.100 1.684
New Zealand 1.426 1.063 1.028
Norway 0.833 0.997 0.695
Poland 0.667 0.967 1.270
Portugal 0.451 0.932 0.962
Slovak Republic 0.882 1.013 1.138
Spain 0.761 0.995 0.796
Sweden 1.023 1.025 0.811
Switzerland 1.064 1.039 1.365
Turkey 0.277 0.860 0.774
United Kingdom 1.089 1.041 0.912
United States 0.675 0.970 0.834
Coe¤. of variation 0.416 0.067 0.226
Notes: a The mean is set equal to one. The covariate-adjusted eigenvector controls for
studentssex, their parentsemployment status and educational level, whether at least one of
the parents was born in a country di¤erent from their current country of residence, whether
there are at least one hundred books at home, the percentage of the school total funding for a
typical school year that comes from the government and whether the assessments of students
are used to make judgements about teacherse¤ectiveness.
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Table 7. Eigenvectors. OECD countries. Mathematical (2012 and 2003) and
reading (2009 and 2000) competences.
Mathematics Reading
2012 2003 2009 2000
Country Unadj. Adj. Unadj. Adj. Unadj. Adj. Unadj. Adj.
Australia 0.940 0.909 1.213 0.876 1.173 0.956 1.345 1.000
Austria 1.049 1.071 1.000 1.241 0.684 0.825 0.882 1.307
Belgium 1.496 1.122 1.657 1.360 1.343 0.954 1.245 1.042
Canada 1.069 1.004 1.154 0.994 1.138 0.983 1.283 0.987
Czech Republic 1.218 1.158 1.482 1.109 0.929 1.212 0.851 0.801
Denmark 0.824 0.977 1.062 0.891 0.743 0.722 0.885 0.849
Finland 1.101 0.979 1.631 1.006 1.502 1.234 1.902 1.303
France 1.048 1.053 1.125 1.204 1.076 0.930 0.947 1.100
Germany 1.475 0.949 1.063 0.896 1.171 0.979 0.897 1.144
Greece 0.443 0.728 0.302 0.761 0.760 0.792 0.591 0.845
Hungary 0.703 0.974 0.660 0.885 0.852 0.995 0.655 0.703
Iceland 0.860 0.722 1.066 0.885 0.969 0.856 0.985 0.868
Ireland 0.965 0.928 0.835 1.043 0.979 1.012 1.382 1.028
Italy 0.820 1.011 0.764 0.913 0.801 1.031 0.722 0.799
Korea 2.097 1.005 1.513 1.135 1.844 1.394 1.198 1.084
Luxembourg 0.982 1.050 0.740 1.243 0.747 1.029 0.410 0.836
Mexico 0.207 0.649 0.147 0.479 0.275 0.583 0.270 0.761
Netherlands 1.343 1.154 1.625 1.338 1.302 1.230 1.825 1.319
New Zealand 1.068 0.908 1.367 0.976 1.609 1.669 1.394 1.187
Norway 0.843 0.781 0.783 0.718 0.958 0.736 1.021 0.834
Poland 1.223 1.624 0.635 1.239 1.025 1.178 0.572 0.803
Portugal 0.811 1.238 0.456 1.037 0.719 0.933 0.630 1.238
Spain 0.860 0.897 0.740 0.802 0.738 0.921 0.778 0.993
Sweden 0.694 0.825 1.014 0.825 0.964 0.907 1.167 0.873
Switzerland 1.312 1.292 1.173 1.336 0.878 1.000 0.850 1.150
United Kingdom 0.870 0.901 1.144 0.961 0.904 0.908 1.323 1.216
United States 0.681 1.093 0.648 0.847 0.916 1.031 0.992 0.931
Coe¤. of var. 0.356 0.194 0.392 0.209 0.316 0.197 0.381 0.182
Notes: The symbols ** and *** indicate that the di¤erence between the component and that
for the same country, subject and eigenvector (adjusted or unadjusted) in the preceding year
is signicant at the 5% and 1% signicance level, respectively. We use bootstrap hypothesis
testing. The covariate-adjusted eigenvector controls for studentssex, their parentsemploy-
ment status and educational level, whether at least one of the parents was born in a country
di¤erent from their current country of residence, whether there are at least one hundred books
at home, the percentage of the school total funding for a typical school year that comes from
the government and whether the assessments of students are used to make judgements about
teacherse¤ectiveness.
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FOR THE REFEREES
Table R.1. Share of students at each prociency level on the mathematical
scale. OECD countries. PISA 2003.
Level 1
Country (or below) Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Sample size
Australia 0.104 0.200 0.284 0.265 0.144 7,195
Austria 0.105 0.221 0.319 0.251 0.101 2,849
Belgium 0.069 0.149 0.241 0.285 0.252 4,752
Canada 0.072 0.215 0.327 0.269 0.115 11,120
Czech Republic 0.076 0.194 0.263 0.262 0.202 3,703
Denmark 0.089 0.222 0.320 0.257 0.109 2,403
Finland 0.040 0.163 0.335 0.298 0.162 3,391
France 0.092 0.209 0.311 0.271 0.115 2,335
Germany 0.124 0.213 0.300 0.241 0.120 2,509
Greece 0.354 0.301 0.220 0.104 0.019 2,563
Hungary 0.183 0.294 0.283 0.183 0.054 3,022
Iceland 0.106 0.222 0.304 0.261 0.105 1,758
Ireland 0.109 0.248 0.346 0.216 0.079 2,276
Italy 0.167 0.266 0.317 0.185 0.063 6,883
Japan 0.088 0.192 0.291 0.278 0.149 3,007
Korea 0.065 0.176 0.276 0.300 0.180 3,334
Luxembourg 0.124 0.212 0.321 0.252 0.088 1,558
Mexico 0.482 0.338 0.148 0.028 0.002 11,273
Netherlands 0.042 0.162 0.279 0.294 0.221 2,192
New Zealand 0.092 0.186 0.288 0.259 0.173 2,182
Norway 0.148 0.254 0.301 0.218 0.076 2,329
Poland 0.174 0.300 0.291 0.174 0.058 2,774
Portugal 0.232 0.320 0.280 0.135 0.031 2,740
Slovak Republic 0.126 0.248 0.296 0.225 0.103 4,493
Spain 0.127 0.258 0.338 0.221 0.054 5,997
Sweden 0.103 0.238 0.308 0.243 0.106 2,662
Switzerland 0.110 0.208 0.291 0.254 0.133 4,602
Turkey 0.431 0.282 0.163 0.076 0.044 2,860
United Kingdom 0.091 0.214 0.308 0.263 0.122 4,897
United States 0.188 0.274 0.287 0.182 0.067 3,216
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Table R2. Studentspersonal and familiar characteristics. Descriptive sta-
tistics. PISA 2003.
Father Mother Foreign Mothers educ. Fathers education
Country Women works works parenta Secondary Tertiary Secondary Tertiary 100 booksb
Australia 49.2 13.2 71.7 40.8 55.1 40.6 53.4 42.3 59.5
Austria 53.0 21.9 69.3 16.5 75.4 22.3 59.7 38.8 45.9
Belgium 48.9 25.0 68.4 22.2 43.9 48.9 45.2 48.5 44.0
Canada 51.1 16.1 78.3 19.3 50.7 47.4 54.5 41.6 53.6
Czech Republic 48.5 5.9 85.5 7.4 78.9 20.5 75.0 24.5 66.1
Denmark 49.8 19.5 83.6 10.9 46.4 50.8 58.1 38.2 47.1
Finland 51.9 16.6 83.3 4.8 38.0 57.0 41.4 49.8 47.4
France 51.8 21.0 73.1 25.4 65.0 28.6 61.9 32.0 44.3
Germany 51.4 17.7 72.8 18.4 69.7 22.4 57.5 35.1 52.3
Greece 50.4 29.8 51.4 14.6 57.6 26.0 50.7 31.9 33.9
Hungary 45.5 14.7 72.5 3.4 75.5 23.9 78.2 21.3 58.0
Iceland 49.8 8.0 85.8 7.1 66.2 27.6 65.2 30.3 64.9
Ireland 53.0 24.0 63.0 15.2 61.5 28.8 57.4 28.4 43.5
Italy 51.7 22.5 64.6 6.6 68.8 23.8 68.8 23.5 43.3
Japan 52.7 22.0 74.1 0.6 52.2 45.4 47.7 45.5 45.3
Korea 39.3 16.2 45.7 0.1 64.9 22.2 55.7 34.6 49.7
Luxembourg 46.7 21.2 61.2 51.2 35.9 45.2 36.6 47.1 52.6
Mexico 53.9 65.8 36.5 2.7 37.9 23.7 39.0 29.3 10.6
Netherlands 49.1 27.7 72.5 18.2 58.7 30.5 49.9 40.1 44.8
New Zealand 46.8 16.5 78.3 38.6 56.1 37.3 60.7 30.2 54.9
Norway 49.6 11.9 83.2 12.0 46.6 51.5 48.7 49.0 64.2
Poland 50.6 25.6 58.7 0.3 82.3 16.2 82.5 13.8 40.8
Portugal 53.1 33.4 70.5 11.3 30.3 21.9 34.3 19.8 31.8
Slovak Republic 49.1 14.5 81.2 6.6 79.2 19.7 75.3 23.8 46.2
Spain 51.6 13.5 61.4 5.5 41.4 29.2 36.4 34.8 53.8
Sweden 49.6 11.2 85.1 16.9 44.4 52.9 49.1 45.1 61.2
Switzerland 48.7 24.5 66.8 38.2 70.5 22.8 56.8 37.9 43.4
Turkey 43.1 48.6 11.1 2.2 30.1 10.1 43.5 21.1 19.4
United Kingdom 53.2 22.4 75.0 17.3 60.7 36.3 62.4 31.8 47.2
United States 49.6 26.9 76.2 21.3 59.0 38.1 61.1 35.3 41.8
Notes: a Indicates whether at least one of the parents was born in a country di¤erent from
their current country of residence or not. b Indicates whether there are at least one hundred
books at home or not.
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Table R.3. Schooling characteristics. Descriptive statistics. PISA 2003.
Large Fund. Evaluate Certied
Country cityc govern.d teacherse Controlf Trackg Monitorh teachersi
Australia 32.4 67.3 97.1 69.2 74.1 88.3 62.3
Austria 29.3 71.5 95.9 69.7 65.7 87.6 71.5
Belgium 32.5 68.4 96.8 70.3 70.4 89.3 61.9
Canada 30.7 47.5 97.6 75.7 85.9 88.0 79.1
Czech Republic 35.8 66.7 96.6 72.6 73.4 89.4 69.6
Denmark 33.8 69.3 94.9 73.6 71.3 86.8 70.5
Finland 32.5 68.6 94.8 70.8 69.7 84.3 69.7
France 36.5 71.4 97.4 67.3 69.6 83.5 72.6
Germany 33.4 69.8 96.0 72.0 69.4 86.6 69.3
Greece 36.3 71.1 94.8 69.5 77.4 84.3 67.8
Hungary 33.6 67.2 96.2 66.2 69.8 87.8 63.1
Iceland 34.9 75.4 97.3 72.0 68.9 87.9 59.0
Ireland 37.9 68.5 98.6 64.8 71.0 83.8 68.3
Italy 34.1 66.1 96.3 67.7 76.5 88.4 61.6
Japan 36.0 69.8 97.6 64.8 70.8 84.2 69.2
Korea 38.3 71.1 96.5 66.9 69.5 84.4 70.3
Luxembourg 29.0 76.1 99.7 79.5 74.2 91.6 57.9
Mexico 31.1 48.4 97.1 76.6 84.9 87.2 77.7
Netherlands 37.2 71.1 96.6 66.7 71.1 85.4 71.0
New Zealand 36.2 71.8 97.2 68.3 72.6 83.6 71.7
Norway 32.6 70.5 95.5 68.8 70.9 84.5 71.1
Poland 37.0 69.9 97.4 67.0 71.5 84.3 72.0
Portugal 37.9 70.4 96.3 66.7 70.8 84.6 70.7
Slovak Republic 31.1 68.1 96.0 72.2 75.6 88.1 62.8
Spain 32.6 67.0 96.9 69.4 76.4 88.4 61.2
Sweden 33.3 70.1 95.7 68.5 69.5 83.8 72.7
Switzerland 30.8 64.6 95.8 70.7 78.1 88.9 62.5
Turkey 34.3 70.7 97.2 69.4 71.3 84.4 68.9
United Kingdom 32.4 67.3 97.0 68.3 76.3 88.9 62.8
United States 35.5 67.3 96.1 69.2 74.0 89.4 63.4
Notes: c Indicates whether the school is located in a city with over one million people or
not. d Informs on the percentage of the school total funding for a typical school year that
comes from the government. e Indicates whether the assessments of students are used to
make judgements about teacherse¤ectiveness or not. f Indicates whether the principal, the
department head or the teachers have the main responsibility for hiring teachers or not. g
Indicates whether students are grouped by ability or not. h Indicates whether the school
monitors the practice of teachers. i Informs on the share of teachers fully certied by the
appropriate authority in the school.
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Table R.4. Share of students at each prociency level on the reading scale.
OECD countries. PISA 2009.
Level 1
Country (or below) Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Sample size
Australia 0.117 0.204 0.296 0.260 0.123 9,975
Austria 0.215 0.249 0.288 0.203 0.045 4,571
Belgium 0.098 0.183 0.280 0.316 0.123 5,731
Canada 0.107 0.216 0.305 0.264 0.107 16,782
Czech Republic 0.145 0.235 0.277 0.252 0.091 4,283
Denmark 0.155 0.272 0.325 0.213 0.034 3,991
Finland 0.073 0.165 0.302 0.329 0.131 4,372
France 0.134 0.207 0.302 0.255 0.102 2,787
Germany 0.118 0.210 0.305 0.280 0.088 2,853
Greece 0.165 0.266 0.316 0.205 0.048 3,676
Hungary 0.142 0.254 0.346 0.217 0.040 3,203
Iceland 0.143 0.215 0.332 0.231 0.079 2,581
Ireland 0.132 0.228 0.329 0.244 0.067 2,596
Italy 0.163 0.241 0.315 0.229 0.051 22,617
Korea 0.036 0.135 0.323 0.376 0.130 3,554
Luxembourg 0.198 0.239 0.293 0.210 0.059 3,053
Mexico 0.337 0.373 0.236 0.052 0.002 21,134
Netherlands 0.082 0.221 0.311 0.284 0.102 3,304
New Zealand 0.093 0.168 0.271 0.286 0.182 2,885
Norway 0.126 0.227 0.326 0.243 0.079 3,299
Poland 0.104 0.234 0.328 0.260 0.075 3,370
Portugal 0.163 0.257 0.332 0.210 0.037 4,748
Spain 0.159 0.250 0.352 0.206 0.033 18,947
Sweden 0.134 0.221 0.327 0.225 0.094 3,132
Switzerland 0.138 0.238 0.325 0.234 0.065 8,502
United Kingdom 0.137 0.241 0.310 0.229 0.084 8,288
United States 0.148 0.247 0.287 0.229 0.089 3,569
OECD total 0.161 0.247 0.306 0.219 0.066 185,245
OECD average 0.145 0.234 0.307 0.236 0.078 6,388
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Table R.5. Studentspersonal and familiar characteristics. Descriptive sta-
tistics. PISA 2009.
Mother Father Foreign Mothers educ. Fatherseduc.
Country Women works works parenta Secondary Tertiary Secondary Tertiary 100 booksb
Australia 51.4 76.8 90.5 39.1 56.2 42.9 59.1 39.7 52.3
Austria 51.7 76.2 93.2 20.5 73.8 24.6 55.2 43.8 42.9
Belgium 49.7 77.1 90.9 25.4 41.7 54.4 46.4 49.1 42.6
Canada 51.3 81.4 90.9 24.8 38.6 60.3 46.8 51.1 48.6
Czech Republic 48.0 84.0 94.3 8.3 73.9 25.9 72.5 27.2 49.3
Denmark 51.6 80.1 87.1 29.2 43.1 52.1 56.0 40.7 37.7
Finland 51.7 87.4 89.0 7.1 24.1 72.6 28.3 66.6 52.3
France 53.0 77.3 90.7 23.6 55.4 42.1 58.8 38.9 41.3
Germany 50.4 75.9 91.1 19.7 69.7 27.4 55.9 42.0 50.0
Greece 51.8 63.1 89.4 15.6 54.4 38.7 51.1 40.3 39.1
Hungary 50.0 75.6 86.0 5.1 69.2 30.3 74.1 25.4 52.0
Iceland 52.3 85.5 92.4 9.1 55.1 44.0 57.0 42.0 58.5
Ireland 49.8 67.8 86.6 23.7 57.1 39.5 56.8 36.2 43.1
Italy 50.1 65.3 93.1 12.0 72.4 24.4 71.9 23.6 41.2
Korea 45.9 52.3 88.1 0.2 63.2 34.3 48.6 48.6 57.2
Luxembourg 52.8 67.2 92.1 55.5 47.8 38.0 44.9 42.2 55.7
Mexico 52.8 39.5 86.7 3.0 40.6 28.3 38.5 33.0 11.2
Netherlands 51.4 78.3 91.8 18.9 53.5 40.7 47.3 46.1 38.6
New Zealand 51.4 79.0 91.2 40.8 56.4 41.1 60.6 36.7 50.6
Norway 49.1 87.6 92.8 14.4 38.9 60.3 44.7 54.1 54.4
Poland 50.3 69.3 85.7 0.6 79.2 20.6 84.9 14.8 37.9
Portugal 52.2 76.3 90.1 19.4 45.5 21.9 43.9 18.9 31.2
Spain 49.8 68.4 90.1 14.5 50.5 37.0 46.3 38.7 49.5
Sweden 50.4 87.4 92.0 21.3 35.4 62.9 46.3 50.6 54.7
Switzerland 49.4 72.4 93.9 40.4 59.5 36.3 48.1 48.6 40.8
United Kingdom 51.1 77.3 88.9 13.1 51.3 47.6 55.4 43.1 42.3
United States 49.4 73.7 85.1 26.4 48.0 47.8 54.0 41.1 35.0
Notes: a Informs on the percentage of the school total funding for a typical school year that
comes from the government. b Indicates whether there are at least one hundred books at
home or not.
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Table R.6. Schooling characteristics. Descriptive statistics. PISA 2009.
Fund Evaluate
Country govern.c teachersd
Australia 57.7 38.6
Austria 60.6 40.5
Belgium 60.5 43.8
Canada 45.1 38.6
Czech Republic 60.6 40.7
Denmark 61.8 39.9
Finland 62.3 45.9
France 56.0 53.5
Germany 60.4 42.7
Greece 59.0 46.6
Hungary 59.1 47.6
Iceland 50.6 43.2
Ireland 58.9 51.7
Italy 45.7 40.5
Korea 41.9 51.0
Luxembourg 43.1 50.2
Mexico 43.1 45.3
Netherlands 42.2 48.6
New Zealand 42.6 51.8
Norway 42.1 46.8
Poland 42.2 49.1
Portugal 42.1 42.2
Spain 43.5 41.1
Sweden 41.8 49.1
Switzerland 43.5 41.2
United Kingdom 43.8 40.3
United States 42.6 52.3
Notes: c Informs on the percentage of the school total funding for a typical school year that
comes from the government. d Indicates whether the assessments of students are used to make
judgements about teacherse¤ectiveness or not.
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Table R.7. Share of students at each prociency level on the reading scale.
OECD countries. PISA 2000.
Level 1
Country (or below) Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Sample size
Australia 0.121 0.184 0.256 0.260 0.179 4,866
Austria 0.155 0.233 0.299 0.238 0.074 4,390
Belgium 0.143 0.157 0.270 0.303 0.126 6,206
Canada 0.105 0.195 0.288 0.269 0.143 28,006
Czech Republic 0.148 0.250 0.311 0.219 0.072 5,110
Denmark 0.156 0.223 0.316 0.230 0.075 3,956
Finland 0.056 0.138 0.287 0.338 0.181 4,617
France 0.139 0.226 0.311 0.247 0.078 4,396
Germany 0.176 0.217 0.283 0.227 0.097 4,751
Greece 0.234 0.266 0.286 0.174 0.040 4,353
Hungary 0.200 0.262 0.308 0.191 0.038 4,521
Iceland 0.133 0.217 0.315 0.252 0.082 3,211
Ireland 0.096 0.171 0.308 0.285 0.141 3,631
Italy 0.173 0.260 0.319 0.202 0.045 4,785
Korea 0.055 0.193 0.405 0.309 0.037 4,583
Luxembourg 0.305 0.286 0.276 0.122 0.012 3,194
Mexico 0.389 0.324 0.215 0.066 0.006 4,005
Netherlands 0.063 0.138 0.287 0.346 0.166 2,359
New Zealand 0.120 0.174 0.252 0.272 0.181 3,396
Norway 0.158 0.197 0.286 0.248 0.111 3,922
Poland 0.248 0.260 0.284 0.166 0.042 3,101
Portugal 0.222 0.251 0.299 0.190 0.037 4,357
Spain 0.146 0.254 0.341 0.225 0.033 5,791
Sweden 0.109 0.198 0.317 0.267 0.109 4,156
Switzerland 0.178 0.223 0.294 0.220 0.085 5,717
United Kingdom 0.111 0.187 0.277 0.263 0.162 8,524
United States 0.156 0.210 0.288 0.233 0.114 2,914
OECD total 0.158 0.218 0.291 0.235 0.097 150,835
OECD average 0.171 0.223 0.291 0.227 0.087 5,201
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Table R.8. Studentspersonal and familiar characteristics. Descriptive sta-
tistics. PISA 2000.
Mother Father Foreign Mothers education Fathers education
Country Women works works parenta Secondary Tertiary Secondary Tertiary 100 booksb
Australia 47.9 71.0 87.1 41.4 41.3 54.5 40.3 54.5 60.5
Austria 49.4 67.2 92.5 15.0 69.9 22.0 66.2 25.6 45.9
Belgium 49.4 64.8 89.0 21.4 27.3 65.5 23.9 69.1 40.9
Canada 49.8 76.9 90.7 20.9 14.7 82.9 21.2 75.2 55.5
Czech Republic 53.5 83.3 91.9 7.9 40.5 58.0 47.6 50.2 64.4
Denmark 49.5 84.0 90.4 12.2 32.4 63.1 45.9 48.9 51.6
Finland 51.6 81.4 86.1 3.2 53.9 40.6 61.9 31.0 44.9
France 50.6 68.0 88.8 24.2 46.7 45.8 47.5 43.2 42.2
Germany 50.9 72.2 92.0 20.5 59.3 29.5 47.4 40.5 52.0
Greece 49.6 47.0 91.0 8.9 45.5 52.6 47.4 50.5 33.0
Hungary 48.7 72.0 81.2 3.7 42.2 56.7 51.4 46.8 62.1
Iceland 50.3 86.3 95.6 6.0 52.4 41.2 51.6 42.4 64.4
Ireland 51.7 61.1 87.9 11.2 38.9 58.8 48.5 48.4 47.0
Italy 51.0 56.6 93.1 4.8 53.4 43.6 53.2 43.9 46.4
Korea 44.5 37.8 85.3 0.1 55.1 42.8 47.3 49.8 51.1
Luxembourg 50.4 54.9 91.5 46.8 47.6 31.3 43.0 37.1 47.5
Mexico 50.4 38.7 91.5 4.5 64.1 21.2 58.1 29.8 17.6
Netherlands 49.7 64.3 91.3 15.9 49.1 44.9 39.4 54.0 44.6
New Zealand 48.9 75.9 90.2 35.9 38.1 46.1 38.0 43.8 54.7
Norway 49.3 83.1 91.6 11.5 32.0 61.5 34.3 58.3 59.9
Poland 48.0 61.3 75.7 1.6 34.6 57.3 43.2 47.2 44.0
Portugal 52.8 68.8 90.9 10.0 68.4 28.7 66.5 29.8 32.3
Spain 50.4 55.3 91.9 5.6 59.3 33.2 51.9 39.8 51.2
Sweden 49.1 84.4 90.9 20.0 24.9 70.2 30.4 63.6 61.7
Switzerland 49.7 64.7 94.8 33.8 69.0 24.8 56.9 37.0 50.3
United Kingdom 49.5 73.1 87.3 13.4 49.8 43.1 53.1 39.0 46.3
United States 52.9 77.7 92.2 20.0 13.1 81.6 13.3 79.5 43.7
Notes: a Indicates whether at least one of the parents was born in a country di¤erent from
their current country of residence or not. b Indicates whether there are at least one hundred
books at home or not.
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Table R.9. Schooling characteristics. Descriptive statistics. PISA 2000.
Funding Evaluate
Country governmentc teachersd
Australia 68.7 27.7
Austria 62.2 18.6
Belgium 67.3 37.6
Canada 34.7 29.8
Czech Republic 74.8 63.6
Denmark 74.6 28.5
Finland 86.1 37.2
France 58.7 37.8
Germany 88.3 11.0
Greece 41.7 21.8
Hungary 57.5 50.5
Iceland 93.6 42.9
Ireland 72.2 38.4
Italy 43.2 77.9
Korea 32.0 24.1
Luxembourg 68.1 38.2
Mexico 58.3 44.5
Netherlands 72.4 40.5
New Zealand 71.4 44.8
Norway 53.5 30.4
Poland 70.9 59.2
Portugal 81.3 29.5
Spain 75.0 41.5
Sweden 41.5 27.5
Switzerland 81.6 8.5
United Kingdom 70.4 61.1
United States 36.9 45.3
Notes: c Informs on the percentage of the school total funding for a typical school year that
comes from the government. d Indicates whether the assessments of students are used to make
judgements about teacherse¤ectiveness or not.
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Keywords: Group performance, compulsory education, heterogeneity, categorical data, 
inverse probability weighting.  
JEL codes: I24, C14.  
*JEL classification
